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Abstract
It is of no surprise that a nation's government has much influence over its citizens
in a political sense, an economic sense, a social sense and even a religious sense. This
influence was especially vivid during the Soviet regime in Russia, which came to an
abrupt end in 1991. This relationship between government and the lives of its citizens in
Russia is what this paper hopes in uncover. First, the paper correlates age with the
perceived advantages and disadvantages under each system of government. The results
show a general trend of increased age being correlated with more positive responses
towards the Soviet government and more negative responses towards the current Russian
Federation. Next, support for each system of government is correlated with income and
religious attendance. The results show that as income increases, support for the
government in power increases as well while there does not appear to be any correlation
with religious attendance. Last, church attendance and religious practices in the home are
examined before and after the fall of the Soviet Union. These results show that there is a
definite increase in church attendance and religious practices in the home after 1991,
confirming the assumption that the Soviet government greatly hindered religion in the
USSR.

Introduction
What kind of progress is possible for a country after twenty short years? Is this
enough time to adjust to a completely foreign system of both politics and economics? Is it
enough time to shift a country's society and social norms? And is it enough time to regain
a religion that for seventy years, has not just been pushed to the side, but pushed out of
the way entirely? These are just a few fascinating questions that can possibly be answered
by examining the past Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation.
During the seventy years under Socialist rule in Russia, many aspects of Russian
life were arguably suppressed (Grossman, 1994). Particularly during the Stalinist rule,
many people abandoned their technical right to freedom of speech, for fear that the
consequences could mean social ostracizing, prison, or even death (Grossman, 1994).
Even so, millions lost their lives between 1936 and 1938 due to the "Stalinist purges"
(Grossman, 1994). The same seemed to hold true for the alleged freedom of religion. Not
only was it not easy to choose a certain religion, it was not easy to choose religion at all
(Greeley, 1994). The official religion of the state was atheism, and those individuals who
were looking to forward their interests in the government and their society were faced
with either hiding their religious tendencies or getting rid of them altogether (Greeley,
1994). This held true with Marxist theory, in which the idea of Communism is based.
According to Marxist philosophy, "In a humanistic, scientific society, there is no need for
the spiritual crutches of the past" (Grose, 1967, p. 402). Lenin would later elaborate with
the quote, "Religion is a sort of spiritual gin in which the slaves of capital drown their
human fiames" (Grose, 1967, p. 402).
The beginning of the war on religion in Russian, according to Pares (1949), began

in the first Five Year Plan (1928-33) under Communist rule. The main objective ofthis
plan included industrializing the country, gaining a stronghold over education, and more
to the point of this paper, stamping out religion. Before this time, the constitution in
Russia, in concerns to religion in the country, read: "Freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda." However, after the five year plan, only anti-religious propaganda
was legal and this propaganda was used to its fullest. Slogans varied fiom the idea that
Holy Communion encouraged drunkenness, to reports fiom airmen who claimed they
flew through the heavens and saw no one. Although much of this propaganda seems
exaggerated, the Soviet Party had one piece of propaganda that was wildly effective on
the masses. This was their attempt to intertwine the church with the final and corrupt
years of Tsardom. They reasoned that, after all, the monarchy fell for a reason (mostly
due to public unrest with the government), and they used this fact to disenfianchise the
church. Almost overnight, the churches were forbidden to provide or engage in any
social activities (e.g. child day care, children's organizations). Also, priests were treated
like outcasts and most were not permitted to live in the towns. They were forced to live
elsewhere and travel into town each day to do their work (Pares, 1949).
These often extreme measures undertaken by the Soviet regime begs the question
of why? Why was eliminating religion such an essential component to the regime?
According to Galinsky (2010), God and government fall into a very similar category
pertaining to people's loyalties and support. It is argued that when people live through a
period when personal control is limited, they turn to established institutions (such as the
church or the government) to guide their lives. In this case, the Soviets wanted to the
sole guiding light and sought to monopolize this role by disenfianchising all other

sources of power and influence (Galinsky, 20 10).
The idea, however, has been presented that the Russian Orthodox religion played
a role in the fall of the Soviet Union. Garrard (2008) notes that religious themes are often
overlooked when examining the Soviet era. When examined more closely, it seems that
the inability of the Soviet regime to eliminate all signs of Russian Orthodoxy contributed
to their fall, as well as the inability to detect growing resistance within the church
(Garrard, 2008). In fact, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Garrard notes that
crowds of Russian citizens did not hold up signs saying c ~ o 6 o n a(freedom) or
neMoKpa-rkIR (democracy). Instead, many hoisted up crosses that read "by this sign,
conquer" (Garrard, 2008, p.242).
Overall, it is definitely important to take a look at the religious effects that the
Soviet rule actually had on the citizens of Russia. Were the Soviets successful in
stamping out religion in the short-term? How about in the long-term? These questions
prove to be very difficult to answer, but the general literature supports the obvious
dwindling of religious faith during the years under Soviet rule, as well as the current
religious revival under the Russian Federation (Greeley 1994). Greeley (1994) cites a
22% increase in religious belief from 1994 to 2004. All respondents in the study
admitted that first they were atheist, but stressed that they are no longer. This is a major
increase in internal religious revival when compared to other Communist counties, such
as East Germany that had only a 5% increase in religious belief (Greeley, 1994).
The history mentioned above, combined with more modern research on religion in
Russia, helped to develop a goal for my research. The current paper seeks to uncover,
examine, and better understand these trends in both a political, economic, and religious

sense. Politically and economically, it was hypothesized that support for either political
or economic system (Authoritarianism~Socialismvs. Democracy/Capitalism) was largely
dependant on a respondent's age. The older the participant, it seemed the more nostalgic
people would feel for the old system, which stressed equal rights among citizens and
provided a plethora of fiee social services such as extensive insurance for the elderly,
work benefits, and fiee educational institutions (Pares, 1949). To many of these
participants, the new idea of competition was a shock. They were at an age where
economic competition was a foreign concept but necessary given their continually
diminishing pensions under the new democratic system.
Another hypothesis generated for this study involved a link between government
participation and economic prosperity, as well as between government involvement and
religious practices. It was hypothesized that if participants had a high level of
involvement in the Soviet government (pre 1991), they would subsequently be less likely
to attend church or be involved in other religious practices, and their income would be
higher. The reasoning here is that if a government is treating its citizens well,
particularly in a monetary sense, these citizens would be more apt to follow the rules and
ideology of that political system. I chose to also examine this trend after the fall of the
Soviet Union (post 1991) and it was again hypothesized that greater support for the
current Russian Federation would be linked with a higher income. However, greater
support for the current government would be linked with greater church attendance since
1991, given that the current government has no ideology that would discourage its
citizens fiom practicing their religion.
The last hypothesis was more general and it examined whether or not the Soviet

government had an effect on church attendance and private religious practices in the
home, over both the short and long-term. It was hypothesized that the Soviet Union did,
in fact, stunt religion both in a public and private sense during their seventy years of rule.
Also, it was hypothesized that in the last few decades after the fall of the Soviet Union,
there has been a resurgence of religious belief and church attendance throughout the
former Soviet Union (Greeley, 1994). This hypothesis is probably the most interesting in
the sense that it examines both public and private religious devotion. It is reasonable to
say that many Russia citizens, during the time of the Soviet rule, would not attend
religious services because it positioned them for both social and literal death. However,
it also seems reasonable that if the citizens were truly devout, they would continue to
practice their religion in their home, away from the eyes of their government watchdog.
Nonetheless, these "reasonable" assumptions could not be further from the truth. A
possible explanation for this lies in research that was noted earlier in this paper.
According to Galinsky (2010), God and government can be fairly interchangeable
entities. They both offer the same type of support in the wake of limited fieedom and
control in one's life and therefore, increased support for one can mean a noticeable
decrease for the other (Galinsky, 20 10).

Methodology
The sample for this study consisted of Russian citizens between the ages of 42
and 73. None were immigrants; all participants were born in Russia and stated that they
had lived in the country all of their lives.
The study was carried out from June 1 to August 8, 2010 in three major cities:

Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yaroslavl (with the majority collected in Yaroslavl). In all,
28 surveys were completed and 25 were deemed acceptable to include in the study. The
other three surveys were kept for possible future study because they provided more
insight into how to improve the wording and effectiveness of the survey. Besides age,
the surveys contained demographic questions that covered gender, nationality, religious
denomination, and city and country of residency. The majority of participants were
female, with 20 female responses and only 5 male responses. This over-representation of
female respondents can be attributed to the line of work (social services) through which
most of the surveys were collected. Of the 25 surveys, 23 participants provided their
nationalities, and of those 23 participants, 20 specified that they were Russian. The other
3 participants specified that their nationalities were Ukrainian, Jewish, and Udmurt.
Religious denominations were slightly more varied. Of the 24 participants who
responded to this question, 18 specified that they were Orthodox, 2 Christians, and 4
atheists. Last, it is important to mention that the sample area of the study was incredibly
small. Most surveys were collected in Yaroslavl, Russia, and 21 of the 25 responses
specified that this was the participant's city of residency. The 4 "other" responses range
fi-om Moscow to the Udmurtia (a small republic of Russia).
The survey questions were designed to examine participants' views and
behaviors, both before and after the fall of the Soviet Union, in various areas, such as
religious and government involvement, social, economic, and political change, as well as
income fluctuations during the 1989 transition. The survey asked 14 questions, some in a
Likert-scale format, and others in an open-ended format.
The f ~ s four
t questions were quantitative and asked about the frequency of church

attendance and religious practices at home, both before and after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Respondents answered according to a scale that read: Several times a week, once
a week, once a month, once a year, and never. No additional, qualitative data were
provided for these particular questions. Procedurally, by including religious practices,
along with church attendance in this section, the survey yielded more personal and
detailed responses. It examined the extent to which a government plays a role in its
citizen's lives and begs the question of whether or not it is possible for a government
ideology to become so ingrained in its citizens that it shapes their actions, even in the
privacy of their own homes. It was hypothesized that the answer to this question was
"yes," and that both church attendance and religious practices in the home before 1991
would occur less fiequently than they do today, given that Soviet ideology did not
encourage religious involvement.
The fifth question was open-ended and qualitative. It sought to clarify and add
detail to the previous 4 questions. I asked whether or not the participants had any interest
in attending church services before 1991. This question was critical in getting specifics
about how people felt about religion and attending religious services before the fall of the
Soviet Union. It was hypothesized that there would be very little interest in general,
either because of a personal non-belief or because of discouragement by the government.
The sixth question asked about whether or not the respondent's religious faith had
faltered at any point in their lives. Given that 6 out of the 25 participants reported either
being an atheist or having an atheistic upbringing, this question was discarded fiom
analyses.
The seventh and eighth questions were quantitative and examined government

involvement before and after 1991. Specifically it asked how involved the respondent
was in the Soviet Government before 1991 (question 7) and how involved they are in the
current Russian government (question 8). Respondents answered according to the
following scale: Involved, moderately involved, rarely involved, and not involved. It was
hypothesized that increased government involvement, in either system, would cause more
favor for that government's ideology and religious behavior would reflect that
(correlating with questions 1-4). In short, if respondents who reported high involvement
in the Soviet government, they were expected to report attending church less often and
practice religion in their homes less frequently.
The ninth and tenth questions were open-ended and qualitative and asked for the
participants to list the advantages and disadvantages under each system of government
(Soviet Union vs. the current Russian federation). It was hypothesized that older
participants would list more advantages under communism and more disadvantages under
the current system, while younger participants would answer in the opposite way.
The eleventh and twelfth questions were qualitative, but unlike the other
qualitative questions, asked the specific question of how much income the respondent
had before and after 1991. It was hypothesized that a higher income, either before or
after 1991, would mean more support and involvement in the particular government
(correlating with questions 7 & 8).
The thirteenth and fourteenth questions asked about the social and economic
advantages and disadvantages under each system. Like question 6, these questions were
discarded fiom analyses when it was noted that they were too similar to questions 9 and
10, and thus were repetitive.

The survey was developed 2 to 3 months prior to data collection in Russia. It was
frst drafted in English and edited to eliminate biased or leading questions. It was then
translated into Russian by a single native speaker, as well as translated back into English
by a second native speaker in order to ensure that meanings were not lost in translation.
After several tests carried out in which a third native speaker was brought in to answer
the survey, ensure the questions made sense and the answers to the questions were
reasonable, the survey was deemed ready.
It is important to note at the beginning of the research project, that not many
responses were successfully collected. It became evident that the subject matter of the
survey was very personal and that many of the participants were untrusting of strangers.
This is why most of the data were collected during the second half of the time span in
Russia and that all the participants were people with whom I had developed
acquaintances. I either worked with or met outside of work with every respondent in a
social sense. The work of my participants was at a non-profit organization that provided
volunteer work for social services (e.g. children's shelter, a hospital for women).
Approximately 5 surveys were given to fiiends, ages ranging from 24-28 that were, in
turn, given to their parents to complete (as this was the age group that was targeted by the
survey). These surveys were usually returned to me within 2 or 3 days, while the other
surveys were handed directly to the participant, either by me or by a translator, and it was
explained only that the research was for a college study and that the answers would be
anonymous. Given the superstitions of many Russians that were encountered in the first
few weeks of data collection, it was important to stress to them that they had no
obligation to answer any questions that made them uncomfortable. At this point, I left

the respondents at an appropriate distance, and it took approximately 10-15 minutes for
the survey to be completed.
When the surveys were returned, I placed them in a stack, without looking at
them, to eliminate any initial biases I may have had about the individual participants and
to avoid any negative responses fiom the participants. About half of the surveys were
translated overseas, with the help of on-site translators who assisted me in my day to day
work. The other half of the surveys was translated upon arriving back in the United
States, by a native speaker and professor at The University of Alabama in Huntsville.

Results
The first hypothesis that stated that age should be correlated with both negative
and positive responses towards Communism and negative and positive responses towards
the current Russian Federation was tested by correlating age with these four factors.
When age was correlated with the number of positive responses towards Communism, r
= .34 andp

=.05, indicating that older respondents generated more positive responses

towards Communism. When age was correlated with the number of negative responses
towards Communism, r = -.11 andp = .3 1. When age was correlated with the number of
positive responses towards the current Russian Federation, r = -.I2 andp = .34. When
age was correlated with the number of negative responses towards the current Russian
Federation, r = .09 a n d p = .34. Although the direction of the trends was consistent with
the hypothesis, these data produced no statistically significant results.
The second set of hypotheses was tested by correlating income with government
support and government support with church attendance, both before and after the fall of

Communism. When income before 1991 was correlated with government support under
Communism, r = .49 andp = .02. When income after 1991 was correlated with
government support for the current Russian Federation, r = .52 andp = .02. When
government support under Communism was correlated with church attendance before
1991, r = .05 andp = .40. When government support for the current Russian Federation
was correlated with church attendance after 1991, r = .14 and p = .26. While the
correlations between church attendance and government involvement elicited no
significant results, the correlation between income and government involvement did
produce statistically significant results.
The third set of hypotheses resulted in statistically significant responses. Both
hypotheses were tested by comparing both church attendance before and after 1991, as
well as religious practices in the home before and after 1991. When comparing church
attendance before 1991 to church attendance after 1991, t = 4.38 andp = .01. When
comparing religious practices in the home before 1991 to religious practices in the home
after 1991, t = 3.16 and p = .O 1. As shown in table 1, the mean of religious practices in
the home and church attendance are greater before 1991 (The questions were measured
on a scale where 1= several times a week and 5= never).

Table 1

Pre 1991

Religious Practices

Church Attendance

Mean

Mean

4.12
Post 1991

Mean
3.60

Std. Deviation
1.48
Std. Deviation
1.44

4.28
Mean
3.48

Std. Deviation
1.10
Std. Deviation
1.05

Discussion

When examining the results of the first correlation, the direction of the trend is
correct in that older participants listed more advantages under the Soviet government and
more disadvantages under the current Russian Federation. The results, however, were
not statistically significant. A possible reason for this could be due to the small sample
site. The survey was also limited in its wording and general order of the questions. By
asking for advantages and disadvantages and asking the two questions, one afier the
other, it encouraged participants to be more objective. For example, if a participant
technically favored the government under the Soviet Union, even they may feel the need
to list at least one or two advantages under the current Russian Federation just because
the question asked them. In revising the survey, it would be advised that, following these
two questions, which of the systems the participants ultimately preferred would be asked.
This would help to make the other two questions and their results much clearer.
The open-ended question provided some insight to the participant's thoughts
when reviewing the most common responses. For the question of the advantages under
the Soviet government, the most common responses were "fiee education," (n = 9) and
"free healthcare/medicine," (n = 8). These responses are of little surprise, given that by
the 1960's more than 70 million Soviet citizens possessed either a secondary or higher
education and more than 65 million regularly attended some form of educational
institution (Freeborn, 1966). Other less common responses for the advantages under the
Soviet government included zero unemployment, stability, a sure future, and equality and
kindness among people. For disadvantages under the Soviet government, the most
common responses were that there were not a wide variety of goods available (n = 4) and

that Russia was a closed State and traveling abroad was difficult (n = 4) as well.
The most common response to the question of the advantages under the current
Russian Federation was that the country is more open (n = 6). For the question about the
disadvantages under the current Russian Federation, the most common response given
was that the participants had to pay for education (n = 3). Other common responses here
included no stability and corruption in the government.
The second set of hypotheses produced both significant and non-significant
results. In regards to government involvement and education, there was a definite
correlation between a participant's income and their involvement or support in the
government during both systems. These results support the proposition that if an
economic system provides a higher yearly income for people, they will link this
economic prosperity with the governmental system in place, and thus be more supportive
of that governmental system. With regards to government involvement and church
attendance, there appears to be no correlation between the two.
The third set of hypotheses produced the most concrete results in the survey.
When comparing church attendance before and after 1991, there was a noticeable and
definite increase in church attendance after 1991. This result is not surprising given the
atheistic views under the Soviet government. Sidorov (2000) examines the resurrection
of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior after it was demolished by the Soviet regime.
Construction on this church commenced before the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia, and
the cathedral was planned to be one of the largest in the world. However, in 1933, the
cathedral was demolished to make room for the Palace of the Soviets monument. This is
but one example of the disregard given to religious institutions and affiliations during the

Soviet era, and this ultimately led to decreased church attendance before 1991.
Furthermore, even when plans to rebuild the monument in the 1990's surfaced, there
were several conflicting sides that halted this progress, showing how divided Russia
remained after the fall of the Soviet Union and that there still remained sympathies and
nostalgia for the fallen regime (Haskins, 2009). However, the question remains as to
whether the lack of church attendance was due to a loss in religious faith or due to fear of
the government (and ultimately a move towards more private religious practices).
This question is answered by tests of the third hypothesis, which compares
religious practices in the home both before and after 1991. According to the results, there
was a definite increase in religious practices in the home after 1991. Given these results,
it is reasonable to speculate that it is possible for a government ideology (in this case the
Soviet ideology) to become so engrained in its citizens, that it affects both their public
and private lives. This argument is supported by Greeley's research data that found a
22% increase in religious belief after the fall of the Soviet Union. Together, these results
support the concept that strict government control can have an internal effect on its
citizens.
Only twenty years since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be a
place of interest when examining economic and political institutions and the effect that
these institutions had on their citizens. With the long-standing history of the Orthodox
Church in Russia, the issue of church vs. state will likely continue to be a contentious
subject for research and further study.
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